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Separation of Church and State in the United States:
Lost in Translation?
CAROL J. GREENHOUSE*
ABSTRACT
In this article, the absence ofan American equivalent to the French word la'fcit6
becomes an ethnographic opening to an exploration of the church -state divide in the
U.S. context. Drawing on classic social theory, sociological accounts, and current
events, I suggest that the constitutional separation of church and state-in addition to
whatever it may mean in legal terms-also expresses a cultural proposition. Specifi-
cally, the separation of church and state posits a dual role for local communities as
both the source offederal power (through representative government) and the founda-
tion of its moral authority. The latter role can be sustained only to the extent that
moral community is conceptualized as "outside" the state, extending to the state solely
through the democratic process. The article concludes with a reflection on the politi-
cization of "moral values" in the 2004 presidential election.
INTRODUCTION
Why is it that the French word lai'cit has no vernacular translation in
English? Secular or lay come close, but neither is quite right-both are too
"church-minded." In the case of the United Kingdom, the absence of translation
is perhaps more easily accounted for in the fact that the monarch is also head of
the Church of England-the historical legacy of a direct royal challenge to papal
sovereignty. In the United States, the constitutional separation of church and
state repeats this challenge by generalizing its elements: The separation of
church and state is not only a warrant for religious liberty, but also a bar against
church-based claims to authority in the state arena. It is also more than this.
*Professor, Department of Anthropology, Princeton University. A.B. (Anthropology) 1971,
Ph.D. (Social Anthropology) 1976, Harvard University. My thanks to Elisabeth Zoller, Alfred
Aman, and the other participants of the conference on "La Conception Amricaine de la La't'ct" at
the Universit6 Paris II (Panth~on-Assas), where I presented this paper on January 28, 2005.
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My purpose in these remarks is not to ask the historical question of how the
constitutional protections of religious liberty and church-state separation came
to take the forms they did. Rather, I consider the connections between religion
and political legitimacy as an interpretive problem in the ethnographic sense. To
state the ethnographic issue more concretely: The church-state divide in the
United States involves more than a legal doctrine concerned with individual lib-
erty. It is also deeply inscribed in institutional forms, conventionalized concepts
of society, and subjective aspects of citizenship and politics. While I am not pre-
pared to venture onto the inevitably speculative ground of the question "What
do Americans believe?," I will suggest that the church-state divide is deeply im-
plicated in the U.S. public sphere in a way that makes lai'cit6 difficult to grasp in-
tuitively from American ground. And so it is not "American culture" that is my
subject here, but the resistance of la'cit6 to American translation.
To begin with some observations: The separation of church and state in the
United States does not by itself create a secular state-and even less so, a secular
public sphere. On the contrary, the constitutional requirement of separation can
be (and is widely) read as a necessary connection between political legitimacy and
religious pluralism-a proposition that carries significant if changeable cultural
content in the United States today. Ethnographic and sociological accounts of
civic, economic, and religious life among Americans return again and again to
this connection as a fundamental principle of personal worth (in both the moral
and economic sense of this term) and criterion of collective social value.
In short, the problem of translation points to a deeper conundrum of com-
paring not just legal institutions and processes, but also social institutions and
political cultures. In this brief essay, I can do no more than broach these compar-
ative issues, and only from one side.
I. LA'CITZ AND MORAL LEGITIMACY
Several current debates in the United States make this a timely moment to
consider issues such as these-for example, the legal contest over whether the
"Pledge of Allegiance" should include the words "under God." In case there are
readers who are not familiar with this element of U.S. public culture, I should
explain that the pledge is a short credo, an oath of citizenship, commonly pro-
nounced by a group in unison at civic occasions-and especially in elementary
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and secondary schools, as a daily opening ceremony.' As in France in the context
of the veiling issue, Americans, too, have had longstanding debates over the civic
display of religious symbols, the latter particularly associated with the Christmas
season (a town hall may erect a Christmas tree but not a nativity scene, for ex-
ample). The courts have also addressed the religious requirements of a Sabbath
and other holidays as an issue in schools and employment, and of religious dress
(yarmulkes and turbans, for example) as these entail modifications of military
uniforms, among other religious practices. But contests over the protection of re-
ligious symbols and practices are only one kind of evidence of the cultural di-
mensions of the question underlying this conference.
This is also a timely moment from another perspective, in that the presiden-
tial elections of 2004 whetted the public appetite (judging by the media, in search
of an interpretation of the outcome) for commentary about the values content of
political life. Such commentary is relatively diffuse-but it is useful, since it com-
presses into a single conversational frame issues of political life and (to use the ver-
nacular expression) "moral values."2 I hear these commentaries as a public
conversation about the moral basis of state action. The separation doctrine in itself
does not answer the question of how the moral basis of the state should be consti-
tuted. Must state action be moral in itself? Or does the moral basis of the state de-
rive from its political legitimacy?3 In the process of crafting the rationale for the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, for example, Robert Kennedy (then U.S. Attorney Gen-
eral) resisted an overtly moral discourse so as to protect the document from chal-
lenge on the basis of exceeding the boundary between state action and private
life-opting instead for the Constitution's so-called "Commerce Clause" guaran-
teeing federal protection for interstate commerce.4 Similarly (if sometimes con-
1. The oath is supported by a ritual posture, standing at attention (men's heads bare) with one's
right hand over the heart. The text reads: "I pledge allegiance to the flag of the United States of
America, and to the republic for which it stands, one nation, under God, indivisible, with liberty
and justice for all."
2. Such questions as these are particularly contentious in the United States at the moment. The
prevailing "spin" on the most recent presidential election interpreted the outcome as a public en-
dorsement of "moral values"-an untestable proposition for various reasons. See Louis Menand,
Permanent Fatal Errors, NEW YORKER, Dec. 6, 2004, at 54-60. But be that as it may, as of the week
after the election, "values" and "issues" had entered common parlance as a representation of con-
trasting worldviews.
3. For a discussion of legal legitimacy, see Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and
the Empowerment of Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion
Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994).
4. GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 201-02 (13th ed. 1997).
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versely), contemporary debates over abortion, capital punishment, affirmative
action, same-sex marriage, and, now, preemptive war, interrogation of military
prisoners, and other issues bearing on security are polarizing precisely because
they press the question of whether state action must be moral in itself, or deriva-
tive from a democratic process through law-revealing a profound lack of con-
sensus. It is not a coincidence that the most contested issues are those affecting the
status of the physical body. For some purposes, the body is the social surface of the
state, while for others, it always stands in front of (before) the state. These are not
questions to which most Americans have fixed or ready answers, and the lack of
consensus reflects not just different religious ideas, but also different ideas about
politics, and the nature and limits of federal power through law.
Let us consider these zones of contention, setting aside for the moment
questions of specific religious tenets and their legal status, so as to consider how
church-state separation works in relation to federal power-purely hypotheti-
cally. For some Americans, the state must always "act" morally (as if it were a
person); morality in this sense does not derive from the political order, but from
the nature of state action in and of itself. For others, the state's moral legitimacy
derives from the political process. These are two substantially different political-
moral worldviews in theory, although they do not necessarily clash as a practical
matter.
II. RELIGION OTHERWISE: THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
In cultural terms, what we call the separation of church and state is perhaps
better described as a "divide"-as if they were two slopes connected by a path
that can be traveled in either direction. Some of the theoretical resources for ex-
ploring this issue derive from the specificities of U.S. experience-most notably
Max Weber's influential account of "the Protestant ethic" in American life. In-
deed, the centennial of the legislation we are marking in this conference is also
the centennial of Weber's classic sociological treatise on religion and "the spirit
of capitalism" in the United States-notably The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of
Capitalism and his extended essay, "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capi-
talism." 5 The latter essay is based in part on Weber's experiences in the United
5. MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM (Talcott Parsons trans.,
Charles Scribner's Sons 1958) (1905); Max Weber, The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism,
in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 302 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills trans. & eds., Ox-
ford Univ. Press 1976) (1906).
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States, in the course of a tour in 1904. His itinerary included a visit with relatives
in North Carolina, where he witnessed a rural baptism by immersion, and de-
veloped his impressions of American Protestantism based on his observations
and informal interviews among his hosts and their acquaintances.
In the course of his travels, Weber was especially impressed with Americans'
pervasive "church-mindedness,"' as measured in terms of both the extent of church
membership and tithing, even among the poor. Reflecting on his observations, he
writes: "Nobody who visited the United States fifteen or twenty years ago, that is,
before the recent Europeanization of the country began, could overlook the very in-
tense church-mindedness which then prevailed in all regions not yet flooded by Eu-
ropean immigrants. '7 To this statement he appends a footnote: "The opening by
prayer of not only every session of the U.S. Supreme Court but also of every Party
Convention has been an annoying ceremonial for quite some time."8 But he quickly
turns back to the social importance of church membership: "If one looked more
closely at the matter in the United States, one could easily see that the question of re-
ligious affiliation was almost always posed in social life and in business life which
depended on permanent and credit relations." He illustrates this thesis with a vi-
gnette, quoting a traveling salesman with whom he had a conversation about
American religion: "Sir, for my part everybody may believe or not believe as he
pleases; but if I saw a farmer or a businessman not belonging to any church at all, I
wouldn't trust him with fifty cents. Why pay me, if he doesn't believe in anything?"9
Church membership followed not just a profession of faith, but also a pro-
cess of qualification, and, in Weber's view, it was through qualification that
church membership came to represent an individual's social worth in a way that
simultaneously affirmed his economic credit worthiness. Membership was espe-
cially important for a mobile society, since "moving one's letter" (i.e., transfer-
ring membership to another congregation) allowed for a transfer of social value
in the new community. Moreover, Weber saw church membership as one ele-
ment in an individual's wider membership in clubs and voluntary associations,
clubs being essential to the personal transformation promised by the cult of the
"self-made man." "In America," Weber writes, "mere 'money' in itself... pur-
chases power, but not social honor. . . [and] the old tradition respected the self-
made man more than the heir.... [T]he specifically American democracy...
6. The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism, supra note 5, at 302.
7. Id. at 302-03.
8. Id. at 303 n.*.
9. Id. at 303.
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Idoesl not constitute a formless sand heap of individuals, but rather a buzzing
complex of strictly exclusive, yet voluntary associations."'"
Churches as clubs (whatever else they may be for individuals in terms of
faith) were the successors to their earlier importance as civic associations-as po-
litical associations and deliberative bodies, integral to the representative democ-
racy of the early republic. Separation of church and state in that context was a
warrant for the democratic foundations of government, in that the churches
were guaranteed an independent existence that could not be subsumed into the
state. The church community became an arena in which members not only
could but had to prove themselves, simultaneously constituting an authoritative
collective discipline and a repertoire of confirming signs in more personal terms.
Thus, the prevalence of churches as the primary voluntary association for
most Americans had the effect of coloring American society with the "ethos" of
Protestant asceticism "-what Weber elsewhere calls "the spirit of capitalism"-
the "individualist impulse" fused through church membership to the institu-
tional spectrum (personal, social, economic, political) of moral value. 12 Weber
argues that the Puritan origins of the spirit of capitalism remain accessible in the
drive to affirm one's identity by material things, valued not in themselves, but as
signs of worth-the traces of the idea of religious calling (or vocation) only par-
tially secularized by the conditions of contemporary life."
Weber's thesis is suggestive for our purposes, given the central place he ac-
cords church membership as the leading context of association of the private sec-
tor, outside of the family and workplace (but also overlapping both of these, as
we shall see). More contemporary ethnographic studies of American Protestant-
ism (including my own) tend to confirm the main elements of his thesis-the so-
cial value placed on church membership, the ascetic ethos of self-fashioning, the
revalorization of capital as a sign of moral value and self-discipline, and the in-
separability of economy, society, and politics from the moral community implied
by church membership. 4 Moreover, some of the central forms of American
10. Id. at310.
11. Id. at 313.
12. Id. at 320-22.
13. See id. at 181-82.
14. For ethnographic discussion and further references, see generally PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN
S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE (1998); CAROL J. GREEN-
HOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE: FAITH, HOPE AND COMMUNITY IN AN AMERICAN TOWN (1986); CAROL
J. GREENHOUSE ET AL., LAW AND COMMUNITY IN THREE AMERICAN TOWNS (1994); SALLY ENGLE
MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS AMONG WORKING-CLAsS
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community life-family reunions (including gender roles within families), as-
semblies, parades, the significance of narrative (testimony), and the rhetoric of
"civil religion"-are the legacy of Protestant ritual forms.15 The forms of civic
life are by no means produced by a single stamp in the United States or any-
where else. Still, social forms such as these are like archives, preserving local
meanings for rereading in the present-and blurring the distinctions between
private and public life.
From this perspective, the constitutional separation of church and state-
whatever else it may be-is less about religion per se than it is about the nature
of community in relation to the problem of democratic government. Most im-
portantly, it specifies local community as moral community, and designates local
moral community as the moral basis of the state. Representative government,
then, is not just the articulated flow of sovereignty from the people to the state;
the church-state divide warrants the source of sovereignty as inexhaustible-in
that the moral community cannot be absorbed structurally into the state. To the
extent that privatization and new hybrid forms of public-private governance are
now prevalent in the United States, Weber's thesis is relevant well past the forms
of local governance and investment that occupied his attention at the turn of the
last century. The depth of these connections between local community and
moral community, and the moral community as the conceptual template for a
private sector distinct from the state, constitute one broad set of reasons why
la'fcit has no vernacular translation in American English.
III. THE STATE OTHERWISE: MODERN GOVERNMENTALITY
So far, we have been discussing the church-state divide from the standpoint
of the way church membership-the template for a wide array of member-
ships-supplies crucial forms and meanings to local social life in the United
States. I have borrowed from Weber and more contemporary sociological ac-
counts to suggest that, viewed from local ground, the church-state divide is (the-
AMERICANS (1990); BARBARA YNGVESSON, VIRTUOUS CITIZENS, DISRUPTIVE SUBJECTS: ORDER AND
COMPLAINT IN A NEW ENGLAND COURT (1993). See also LIVED RELIGION IN AMERICA: TOWARD A
HISTORY OF PRACTICE (David D. Hall ed., 1997).
15. On reunions, pilgrimages, and assemblies, see generally GWEN KENNEDY NEVILLE, KINSHIP
AND PILGRIMAGE: RITUALS OF REUNION IN AMERICAN PROTESTANT CULTURE (1987); W. LLOYD
WARNER, THE FAMILY OF GOD: A SYMBOLIC STUDY OF CHRISTIAN LIFE IN AMERICA (1961). On
"civil religion," see Robert N. Bellah, Civil Religion in America, 96 DAEDALUS 1 (1967).
CAROL J. GREENHOUSE
oretically) a bridge between local moral communities on the one hand, and state
and federal power on the other. Let us now turn to the other end of that bridge,
to consider, if only briefly, some issues bearing more directly on the nature of the
state implied in this arrangement. Here, my focus is solely on the federal govern-
ment-a major limitation in terms of how the state actually functions, but per-
haps less so for purposes of my discussion. Here, too, I want to suggest that the
federal government is not merely a structural or institutional arrangement, but
also a system of meaning-a discourse, in the Foucauldian sense. One route
across this theoretical bridge would be to ask whether and how the federal dis-
course accommodates the ambiguous exteriority of its moral foundations (as dis-
cussed above). I consider two paths in this regard.
Clearly, one path is through the democratic process-conceived as a dy-
namic hierarchy of democratic arenas, each one representing the one below. Less
clear is the extent to which American voters imagine this hierarchy as ideally en-
compassed by a circuit of personal moral identification-that is, measuring pol-
iticians by the same standards one would bring to the choice of a partner or a
spouse. For some, consistent with Weber's thesis, this is clearly very important-
the "likeability" factor, to borrow pollsters' argot. For others, it is not impor-
tant-politics being a job description that should be measured by performance,
rather than by the candidate's (or incumbent's) personal character. This has been
a frequently recurring theme of American political commentary since 1998,
dominating both the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections.
These might be two responses to a situation created by the expansion of the
federal state through the civil rights era and through regulatory agencies (dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s), and then, in quick succession, the ideological disman-
tling of "big government" in favor of private forms of regulation-leaving local
communities in a sense doubly displaced, first by federal legislation and law en-
forcement and then by neoliberal privatization. 6 Particularly for communities
inclined to resist the earlier developments, the latter period might have offered
ideological but not substantive comfort, since deregulation and retrenchments
on civil rights did not return power to local governments. 7 The attempt to har-
ness federal power to local community norms would seem to be symptomatic of
16. Cf Jacques Donzelot, The Mobilization of Society, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN
GOVERNMENTALITY 169 (Graham Burchell et al. eds., 1991) (examining social democracy and
neoliberalization as responses to perceived problems of the "welfare state" in France).
17. ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW
REFORM 46-47 (2004).
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this structural disappointment, whereas for others, in other subjective political
positions, a more managerial outlook could be a meaningful accommodation to
changing times. The renaissance of "church-mindedness" (from above) is deeply
coded as an appeal to the former structural reaction, and the calls for "traditional
moral values" are (whatever else they might yield in terms of substantive legisla-
tion) clearly intended as a symbolic warrant for the president's moral fitness-
paradoxically expanding the discursive scope for executive power rather than
returning it to local communities. Be that as it may, the relationship between
moral identification (through representation) and the structure of the political
institutions of government is one path along which the church-state divide sur-
faces as a structural feature within the state.
The second path, correspondingly, has to do with what Michel Foucault
calls "the art of government" or "governmentality."' 8 He offers this expression to
refer to the contexts in which the functions of government are inherent in its
form, conceived through (and borrowing the moral legitimacy of) a model of au-
thority worked out elsewhere, in another register. For example, he proposes that
while early state governmentality worked through the authority of the family,
modern governmentality rests on a break from the family form:
What... now emerges into prominence is the family considered
as an element internal to population, and as a fundamental instru-
ment in its government.... [P]rior to the emergence of popula-
tion [i.e., the idea of population], it was impossible to conceive the
art of government except on the model of the family, in terms of
economy conceived as the management of a family; from the mo-
ment when, on the contrary, population appears absolutely irre-
ducible to the family, the latter becomes of secondary importance
compared to population, as an element internal to population: no
longer, that is to say, a model, but a segment. 9
By this criterion the situation of governmentality in the United States is not
fully modern, in Foucault's sense. While the family is privileged as a source of in-
formation (as Foucault says is the essence of its role as a segment of government),
18. See generally Michel Foucault, Governmentality, in THE FOUCAULT EFFECT: STUDIES IN Gov-
ERNMENTALT,supra note 16, at 87.
19. Id. at 99-100.
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it also remains more than that in the United States-not quite a template, not ex-
actly a technology, the family is deeply embedded in the encodings by which the
functions of state governing are legible as moral propositions as well as institu-
tional claims to efficacy. Oddly, perhaps, the federal implication of "family values"
works both ways-sometimes concealing the state implication in the experience
of gender and partnership, for example, but equally concealing the fabric of iden-
tifications that makes government creditable in democratic terms.
The indispensability of family to the mutual recognition of state and citizen
through social security is evidence of a circuitry of legitimacy that is not wholly
contained by either (that is, by state or citizens).
To summarize: I have suggested that the separation of church and state in
the United States is more than a legal doctrine protecting individual religious
liberty; it is also a cultural proposition as to the moral architecture of the U.S.
state. That proposition is structural in character, stipulating the source of the
state's moral order as originating in local communities conceived as moral
communities-and thereby a component in the federal system of checks and
balances. From the interpretive standpoint I have been developing in this essay,
the church-state divide is a warrant for both individual liberty and a moral econ-
omy only partially vested in state power. It is this structural implication of the
church-state divide, not the implication of liberty, that makes la'icit difficult to
translate. Since the language of Carl Schmitt has become widely familiar
through the administration's rhetoric of "friends" and "enemies" in the interna-
tional context, I will venture the further observation that Schmitt's first prescription
for democracy-overcoming the antithesis between politics and religion-poses
similar difficulties of translation into the American context.2° In the American
context, at least, it is difficult to imagine the elimination of this divide as an ad-
vance for democracy, since it is the very thing that most conspicuously renders
local communities irreducible-and therefore indispensable-to the moral le-
gitimacy of government, confirmed through political checks.
Should we look for a popular translation of la'cit6 in some future edition of
the Robert-or better yet, Webster'-sdictionary? To say yes would mean ignor-
ing historical and sociological specificities in relation to what currently counts as
national experience. And yet it is not possible to say no, since future challenges to
democracy cannot be known in advance.
20. CARL SCHMITT, THE CONCEPT OF THE POLITICAL 23, 26 (George Schwab trans., 1996).
